Concerted Activity and Social Media: Why Facebook Is Nothing Like the Proverbial Water Cooler by Ferrall, Natalie J.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 4 Article 4
4-20-2013
Concerted Activity and Social Media: Why
Facebook Is Nothing Like the Proverbial Water
Cooler
Natalie J. Ferrall
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Computer Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Natalie J. Ferrall Concerted Activity and Social Media: Why Facebook Is Nothing Like the Proverbial Water Cooler, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 4
(2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol40/iss4/4
04 FERRALL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13 8:24 PM 
 
1001 
Concerted Activity and Social Media: 
Why Facebook Is Nothing Like the 
Proverbial Water Cooler 
I. INTRODUCTION
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY UNDER  
 THE NLRA
A. Board Precedent: The Landmark Cases
1. Meyers Industries, Inc. and Its Progeny: Focusing on 
Group Action, Not Individual Interests
2. Atlantic Steel Company: Setting Boundaries and Losing 
Protection Due to Opprobrious Conduct
3. Jefferson Standard: Relating to an Ongoing Labor 
Dispute; Must Not Be So Disloyal, Reckless, or Untrue 
as to Lose the Protections of the Act
4. Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc.: Introducing 
Online Communication to the Canon of Protected 
Concerted Activity Cases, But Just Barely
5. Mushroom Transportation Company: Mere Griping Is 
Not Enough to Deserve Protection
B. Standards for Employers’ Social Media Policies
C. Summary of Rules Regarding Concerted Activity
III. TRYING TO FIT A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: THE BOARD’S  
 MISAPPLICATION OF DATED PRECEDENT TO CURRENT SOCIAL  
 MEDIA CASES
A. Hispanics United
B. Collections Agency
C. Karl Knauz Motors
D. Triple Play
IV. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A CATEGORY ALL ITS OWN: THE INADEQUACY  
 OF TRADITIONAL TESTS, AND WHAT MAKES SOCIAL MEDIA  
 DIFFERENT FROM THE PROVERBIAL WATER COOLER
A. The Public Factor: Acknowledging the Omnipresent 
Audience Built into Social Media Websites
B. The Intent Factor: Who Are You Talking to, and Why?
V. DEVELOPING A NEW FRAMEWORK: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
04 FERRALL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:24 PM 
 
1002 
A. Shifting the Focus in the Board’s Current Analysis of 
Online Social Media Communications
B. Employers’ Social Media Policies: An Opportunity for 
Employers to Create Their Own Social Networks
VI. IMPACT: BENEFITING THE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE ALIKE
VII. CONCLUSION
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mark Zuckerberg, the twenty-eight-year-old1 founder and chief 
executive officer of Facebook,2 said in 2010 that “[u]p until recently, the 
default on the Web has been that most things aren’t social and most things 
don’t use your real identity. . . .  We’re building towards a Web where the 
default is social.”3  And social it is: during the past eight years, people across 
the globe have developed a voracious appetite for social media and show no 
signs of slowing down.4  Facebook, founded in 2004, had one billion active 
monthly users and 584 million daily users by the close of 2012.5  Twitter,6 
founded as recently as 2006,7 boasted over 500 million accountholders by 
2012.8  YouTube,9 launched in 2005, currently facilitates over four billion 
video views per day.10  Google+,11 the newest addition, began in June 2011 
 1.  World’s Most Powerful People—Mark Zuckerberg, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/mark-zuckerberg/ (last updated Nov. 2011). 
 2.  Management, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=1 (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013).  Facebook is a social networking website that allows users to create personal 
profiles, add other users as “friends,” and communicate with those friends by sharing updates, 
photos, videos, and other content.  See Facebook—About, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 3.  Mark Zuckerberg, Founder, Facebook, Keynote Speech at the F8 Conference (Apr. 21, 
2010), available at http://www.livestream.com/f8conference/video?clipId=pla_e7a096b4-3ef9-466d-
9a37-d920c31040aa. 
 4.  See infra text accompanying notes 5–10. 
 5.  Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 6.  Twitter is a social media website self-described as a “real-time information network” 
whereby users can post Tweets of 140 characters or less and connect with other users by following 
them and sending personal messages.  About, TWITTER, twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 11, 
2013). 
 7.  Nicholas Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-04-13/tech/29957143_1_jack-dorsey-twitter-podcasting. 
 8.  Twitter Reaches Half a Billion Accounts, SEMIOCAST (July 30, 2012), 
http://semiocast.com/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_reaches_half_a_billion_accounts_140m_in_
the_US. 
 9.  YouTube is a website that hosts video content and allows people to watch and upload 
videos.  About YouTube, YOUTUBE, www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 10.  Andrew Couts, YouTube: Now Serving 4 Billion+ Video Views Daily, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 
23, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/youtube-now-serving-4-billion-video-views-daily-
173018803.html. 
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and reported a user base of 90 million within six months.12  The memorable 
line from the film The Social Network13 echoes louder and louder as social 
media solidifies its grip on the modern world: “We lived on farms and then 
we lived in cities and now we’re gonna live on the [I]nternet.”14 
All this living on the Internet raises a myriad of issues in the 
employment context.15  On one hand, companies embrace social media as a 
powerful marketing tool that facilitates employee connections with clients, 
potential customers, and other industry professionals.16  Employers can 
further utilize social media to help locate new talent; in 2011, eighty-nine 
percent of companies said they used social media for recruitment purposes.17  
 11.  Google+ is a social networking and identity service operated by Google, which incorporates 
existing services such as Google Profiles with new onesnamely, Circles, Hangouts, and 
Gamesand allows users to tailor their online sharing to specific groups.  Learn More, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/+/learnmore/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); see also Martin Kaste, Facebook’s 
Newest Challenger: Google Plus, NPR (June 29, 2011, 5:35 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/29/137507567/facebooks-newest-challenger-google-plus. 
 12.  Lucas Shaw, Google 4Q Earnings Miss the Mark, Google Plus Hits 90M Subs, REUTERS  
(Jan. 19, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/idUS427563801220120119.  
For more information regarding social media’s steep rise in popularity, see generally Jenise Uehara 
Henriskson, The Growth of Social Media: An Infographic, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.searchenginejournal.com/the-growth-of-social-media-an-infographic/32788/. 
 13.  The Social Network is a feature film released in 2010 about the founders of Facebook.  See 
THE SOCIAL NETWORK, http://www.thesocialnetwork-movie.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 14.  AARON SORKIN, THE SOCIAL NETWORK, 155 (screenplay), available at 
http://flash.sonypictures.com/video/movies/thesocialnetwork/awards/thesocialnetwork_screenplay.p
df. 
 15.  See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See Rhianna Collier, SIIA Survey: Marketing Executives Believe Social Media Is an Effective 
Tool; Not Yet Investing Significant Resources, SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUSTRY ASS’N (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://www.siia.net/blog/index.php/2012/02/siia-survey-marketing-executives-believe-social-media-
is-an-effective-tool-not-yet-investing-significant-resources/.  “Social media has clearly become a 
widely used tool among [business-to-business] marketers and few doubt that it is helping their 
business.”  Id.; see also Joshua Tucker, CEO Bans Email, Encourages Social Networking, 
ENGADGET (Dec. 1, 2011, 12:33 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2011/12/01/ceo-bans-email-
encourages-social-networking/ (reporting that the chief executive officer of a French information 
technology firm plans to “ween 80,000 employees off” of email during the next eighteen months, 
and instead promotes a “collaborative social network similar to Facebook or Twitter to fill email’s 
void and suffice as an easily accessible global network”). 
 17.   Kristin Piombino, Infographic: 89 Percent of Companies Use Social Media to Find New 
Hires, RAGAN’S HR COMM. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.hrcommunication.com/SocialMedia/ 
Articles/Infographic_89_percent_of_companies_use_social_med_7260.aspx.  LinkedIn, a dominant 
player in social media recruitment, “isn’t the only social network that’s used for recruiting.  Fifty 
percent of companies use Facebook to find talent, and [forty-five] percent use Twitter.”  Id. 
  By the same token, the Internet affords “a potential, and tempting, treasure trove of 
information about prospective employees,” and employers must be careful not to use social media 
websites to obtain improper data concerning applicants (including, for example, race, national origin, 
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On the other hand, social media websites can raise significant liability issues 
for employers.18  Whereas “[d]isgruntled employees . . . once griped to each 
other in person,” they are now free to “complain about their workplace” on 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, personal blogs, or whatever other Internet 
outlet they choose.19  Social media websites can thus “expose employers to 
risks of potential defamation claims, improper disclosure of confidential 
information, and damage to an employer’s reputation.”20  The National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) began addressing these types of 
issues in late 2009,21 and, since then, the Board has heard a steadily 
increasing number of social media cases across the country.22 
Consider, for example, the headline-grabbing23 2010 case of American 
Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.,24 which illustrates the nature of the 
or religion in order to screen applicants based on a protected class).  Robert Sprague, Rethinking 
Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 395, 398–99 
(2008).  Furthermore, twenty-nine states have adopted “lifestyle statutes” that prohibit employers 
from considering off-duty conduct (such as drinking, smoking, overeating, and personal relations) in 
hiring or firing decisions “so long as the off-duty activities have no employment-related 
consequences.”  Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices for 
Utilities Engaging Social Media, 32 ENERGY L.J. 1, 15 (2011). 
 18.  Peter J. Pizzi, Where Cyber and Employment Law Intersect, Risks for Management Abound, 
in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 29, 29 (2011), available at 2011 WL 
3020563. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id.; see generally Julianne Pepitone, 6 Painful Social Media Screwups, CNNMONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/technology/1104/gallery.social_media_controversies/index.htm
l (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
 21.  In Sears Holdings, the Board interpreted the validity of an employer’s social media policy; it 
refrained, however, from addressing what constitutes protected employee activity in the social media 
realm.  Sears Holdings, N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. Case No. 18-CA-19081 (Dec. 4, 2009), 
available at http:/mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45802d802f [hereinafter Sears 
Holdings].  The Board developed its position on the matter in later cases.  See infra notes 136–75.  In 
Sears Holdings, an electrical workers’ union, throughout its campaign to organize service 
technicians, utilized several types of social media—including Facebook, Myspace, and a specifically 
tailored website and group email subscription service—for the purpose of fostering communication 
among employees.  Sears Holdings, supra, at 1–2.  The employer later issued a social media policy 
that prohibited employees from using social media for “[d]isparagement of [the] company’s or 
competitors’ products, services, executive leadership, employees, strategy, and business products.”  
Id. at 3.  The Board ultimately concluded that Sears’ policy was valid because it could not be 
reasonably interpreted to chill employees’ protected speech under the National Labor Relations Act; 
rather, a reasonable reading of the policy showed that it only prohibited “online sharing of 
confidential intellectual property or egregiously inappropriate language and not . . . protected 
complaints about the [e]mployer or working conditions.”  Id. at 6–7.  For a detailed discussion 
concerning the history and meaning of protected employee activity, see infra notes 47–135 and 
accompanying text.  For further information about lawful social media policies under the National 
Labor Relations Act, see infra notes 233–53 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See Sam Hananel, Woman Fired over Facebook Rant; Suit Follows, NBC NEWS.COM (Nov. 
10, 2010, 9:43 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40097443/; Renée M. Jackson, Media Frenzy 
over NLRB Complaint Against Connecticut Employer for Terminating Employee Who Criticized 
Employer on Facebook Not Warranted—Yet, NIXON PEABODY (Nov. 16, 2010), 
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problem facing employers and employees in the current virtual landscape.  
There, the NLRB addressed for the first time whether an employee could 
publish disparaging speech against her employer on a social media website.25  
The employee Souza posted a series of negative comments about her 
supervisor to her Facebook page following a confrontation with him at 
work.26  Specifically, she referred to her supervisor as a “scumbag,” a “17 
[AMR code for a psychiatric patient],” and a “dick.”27  Several of Souza’s 
current and former coworkers chimed in and commented on her post, saying 
things like “I’m so glad I left [AMR]” and encouraging Souza to “[c]hin 
up!”28  AMR later fired Souza, listing her Facebook comments as one of the 
reasons for her termination.29  The social media policy at AMR prohibited 
“making disparaging, discriminatory or defamatory comments when 
discussing the [c]ompany or the employee’s superiors, co-workers and/or 
competitors.”30  The Board’s regional office filed a complaint against AMR, 
alleging that the employer violated federal labor law by terminating Souza 
for her Facebook comments.31  Though the case ultimately settled, as part of 
the settlement AMR agreed to narrow the scope of its social media policy.32 
 Granted, the Board never actually decided AMR.33  The case is 
especially important, however, because it prompted the NLRB Acting 
General Counsel Lafe Solomon to declare the Board’s position on social 
media cases—namely, that communicating via social network websites is 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/ELA_Alert_11_16_10.pdf; Sara Yin, Connecticut Woman Fired 
Over Facebook Rant, PCMAG.COM (Nov. 10, 2010, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372465,00.asp. 
 24.  Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc. (AMR), N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. Case No. 34-
CA-12576 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4 [hereinafter AMR]. 
 25.  Id. at 1; Hananel, supra note 23 (indicating that the Board referred to the case as “the first 
complaint [it had] issued over comments on Facebook . . . .”). 
 26.  AMR, supra note 24, at 3. 
 27.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 28.  Id. at 3–4. 
 29.  Id. at 4–5. 
 30.  Id. at 5. 
 31.  Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, NLRB (Feb. 8, 
2011), http://nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-involving-discharge-facebook-comments. 
 32.  Id.  AMR agreed “to revise its overly-broad rules to ensure that they do not improperly 
restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours and working conditions with co-workers and 
others while not at work, and that they would not discipline or discharge employees for engaging in 
such discussions.”  Id. 
 33.  See id. 
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“the same as talking at the water cooler.”34  The proverbial water cooler, in 
the context of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), is the 
quintessential safe haven for employees.35  It traditionally referred to the 
place where employees came together and discussed working conditions, 
and the NLRA mandates that those types of discussions be protected from 
adverse employment actions.36  The General Counsel’s analogizing 
Facebook to the water cooler indicates the Board’s strong push, from the 
outset, toward shielding employee statements on social media websites from 
employers.  Indeed, the Board’s recent decisions since AMR demonstrate 
that it has continued along the same line of analysis.37  In this respect, the 
Board is misguided.38  Facebook—as well as Twitter, YouTube, Google+, 
and all the other burgeoning social media websites available to employees in 
the United States today—is nothing like a water cooler, and should not be 
understood as such.39  Rather, social media deserves a separate analytical 
framework that recognizes the unique and evolving character of modern 
communication.40
This Comment explores whether employees engage in protected 
concerted activity under the NLRA when they post negative statements 
about their employers to social media websites.  Part II explains the 
definition of protected concerted activity under the NLRA, as interpreted by 
the Board through several landmark decisions from the past several 
decades.41  Part III discusses the Board’s current application of its precedent 
to recent cases involving social media.42  Part IV argues that such precedent 
is inadequate to address the distinct qualities of social media and that the 
Board has misapplied dated law to recent cases involving social media.43  
Part V sets forth recommendations for alternate ways to analyze social 
media communication and makes suggestions regarding how employers can 
 34.  David Alim-Young, NLRB Weighs in on Social Networking—”The Facebook Complaint,” 
NLRB INSIGHT (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.nlrbinsight.com/2011/02/nlrb-weighs-in-on-social-
networking-the-facebook-complaint/. 
 35.  See NLRB Judge Finds Firings Based on Facebook Posting Unlawful, HRWATCHDOG 
(Sept. 12, 2011, 9:42 AM), http://calchamber.typepad.com/hrwatchdog/2011/09/nlrb-judge-finds-
firings-based-on-facebook-posting-unlawful.html. 
 36.  Id.  “The typical example of a protected activity is when employees gather around the water 
cooler to complain about their supervisor.”  Id.  For more information as to what it means to be a 
protected activity, see infra Part II. 
 37.  See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 38.  See infra notes 233–66 and accompanying text. 
 39.  See infra notes 233–66 and accompanying text. 
 40.  See infra notes 233–66 and accompanying text. 
 41.  See infra notes 47–135 and accompanying text. 
 42.  See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 43.  See infra notes 176–232 and accompanying text. 
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tailor their social media policies to comply with Board standards.44  Part VI 
examines the impact of this Comment’s approach on both employers and 
employees.45  Part VII concludes.46 
II.  WHAT CONSTITUTES PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE 
NLRA 
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, which gave 
employees the federal right to organize and bargain collectively.47  The 
purpose of the Act was to prevent “unfair practices” between employers and 
employees that had the effect of obstructing the free flow of commerce.48  Its 
current version incorporates the original Wagner Act of 1935,49 the Taft–
Hartley amendments of 1947,50 and some small changes from the Landrum–
Griffin Act of 1959.51  Indeed, the text of the NLRA “has remained virtually 
untouched since 1959.”52  The Act covers employer–employee relations in 
 44.  See infra notes 233–53 and accompanying text. 
 45.  See infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text. 
 46.  See infra notes 267–81 and accompanying text. 
 47.  29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2006). 
 48.  Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1938).  The Act’s policy declaration 
reads: 
 It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of 
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
  The Board website states that the NLRA was enacted “to protect the rights of employees and 
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and 
management practices, which can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses, and the U.S. 
economy.”  National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, http://nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2013). 
 49.  National Labor Relations Act (Wagner–Connery Labor Relations Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)). 
 50.  Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 51.  Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum–Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 52.  Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1533 (2002).  Estlund writes, “[o]ne of the most striking features of American labor law is the age of 
its basic governing text.”  Id. at 1532. 
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the context of labor disputes affecting interstate commerce.53  The National 
Labor Relations Board and its General Counsel constitute the enforcement 
mechanism of the NLRA, acting through regional and field offices across 
the country.54 
Section 7 of the Act expressly provides for the following employee 
rights, the last of which is at issue in cases involving employee speech via 
social media: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection . . . .”55  Employees who engage in “concerted activities” are 
therefore sheltered from adverse employment actions in retaliation.56  The 
Act prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing 
employees who choose to exercise these rights.57  The NLRA does not 
specifically state what constitutes a “concerted activity,” and so the Board 
has interpreted and defined the term through case-by-case determinations 
since the Act’s inception.58 
Concerted activities encompass lawful union activities as well as 
nonunion group activities.59  The most important aspect of a concerted 
activity is that it relates to wages, hours, or working conditions.60  Once this 
 53.  29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).  The term “employee” includes non-supervisory employees who are 
either members of a union or trying to unionize.  Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563–64 
(1978). 
 54.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2006); What We Do, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 55.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 56.  Calvin William Sharpe, “By Any Means Necessary”—Unprotected Conduct and Decisional 
Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 206 
(1999). 
 57.  29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this 
title . . . .”). 
 58.  See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (“The Wagner Act did not 
undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident 
which would constitute an unfair labor practice.  On the contrary, that Act left to the Board the work 
of applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events 
which might be charged as violative of its terms.  Thus a ‘rigid scheme of remedies’ is avoided and 
administrative flexibility within appropriate statutory limitations obtained to accomplish the 
dominant purpose of the legislation.”). 
 59.  See Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1953) 
(“Concerted activity may take place where one person is seeking to induce action from a group.”); 
NLRB v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948) (“A proper construction [of 
section 157 of the Act] is that the employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities . . . 
even though no union activity be involved, or collective bargaining be contemplated.”). 
 60.  See Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 317, 319 (1976).  The administrative law 
judge held, and the NLRB affirmed, that “[i]t is the public policy of the United States, however, 
embodied in the Act, to insulate from discharge or discipline any employee who refuses to work in 
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threshold is met, the activity remains protected regardless of whether it is 
illogical or unreasonable in nature.61  In previous cases, the NLRB has been 
careful to shield concerted activities from adverse employment actions—
even in situations where an individual’s conduct arguably may be 
inappropriate or, in some cases, categorically outrageous—in order to 
uphold the important rights of employees to organize and work together to 
address working conditions.62 
A.  Board Precedent: The Landmark Cases 
The NLRB has relied on several important decisions in determining 
whether an activity in the online social media context is concerted, and thus 
protected, under the NLRA.63  Of the five cases highlighted below, four were 
decided before 1985 and have nothing to do with the Internet, much less 
social media in the workplace.64  The fifth case, decided in 2007, touches 
order to pressure his employer to make concessions concerning his wages, rates of pay, hours, or 
working conditions.”  Id. 
 61.  Id.  The employer in Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. argued that its employees’ conduct was 
unreasonable and therefore not protected.  Id.  In that case, ten employees refused to work until they 
were paid the higher wages that the company promised to them, even when their supervisor offered 
to pay them out of his own pocket if they would go back to work.  Id. at 318–19.  The administrative 
law judge ruled that the employer’s argument was “irrelevant” because “it is not necessary that 
employees strike for a reasonable objective in order to enjoy the Act’s protection, it is only 
necessary that the object be related to securing wages, etc.”  Id. at 319. 
 62.  See NLRB v. Allied Aviation Fueling of Dall. LP, 490 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
union employee who forged another employee’s signature on a grievance he filed on the other 
employee’s behalf was engaging in protected activity because he did not act for his own benefit but 
rather for the protection of the other employee’s rights); Roadmaster Corp. v. NLRB, 874 F.2d 448 
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a union officer’s public speech regarding a company mislabeling a 
controversy was protected concerted activity); Nordstrom, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 294 (2006) 
(determining that when employees refused to speak to a coworker who testified in a Board hearing 
on behalf of the employer, they were engaged in protected concerted activity; the Board reasoned 
that their nonverbal solidarity related to wages, hours, and terms of employment, and such behavior 
was similar to verbal outbursts toward antiunion employees), overruled on other grounds by J & R 
Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. 9 (2010); Oakes Mach. Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 456 (1990) (holding that 
employees’ sending a letter to the employer’s chairman that was unsigned and criticized the 
president’s ability to manage the company was protected concerted activity); Lumbee Farms Coop., 
285 N.L.R.B. 497 (1987) (stating employees’ activity was protected when they walked out to protest 
the employer’s hiring of “foreigners” and to demand a wage increase); Millcraft Furniture Co., 282 
N.L.R.B. 593 (1987) (deciding that conduct was protected when employees insisted on delivering 
grievances to a manager other than the manager who was assigned to receive grievances). 
 63.  See infra notes 66–135 and accompanying text. 
 64.  See infra notes 66–101, 110–14 and accompanying text.  There are two additional cases to 
which the Board has looked frequently in social media cases, but they are not included in this 
Comment.  The first is the Supreme Court case of NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 
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briefly on Internet publication; however, the facts do not involve social-
media-related concerted activity, but instead revolve around more traditional 
forms of union activity and expression against employers.65 
1.  Meyers Industries, Inc.66 and Its Progeny: Focusing on Group Action, 
Not Individual Interests 
The Meyers line of cases,67 decided in the 1980s, established that an 
individual employee’s activity must be linked to the actions of fellow 
employees in order to be classified as “concerted” under the NLRA.68  These 
four cases involved Kenneth Prill, a truck driver who was hired by Meyers 
Industries, Inc. to drive a company-issued truck and trailer and haul boats 
from the employer’s facility in Michigan to dealers across the United 
States.69  Prill began experiencing brake and steering problems with his 
equipment and complained about these deficiencies to the president of the 
company, his supervisor, and the company’s mechanic.70  Despite these 
complaints, Meyers Industries never fully addressed the problems with 
Prill’s equipment, and the trailer brakes continued to cause Prill trouble.71  
On a return trip from a drive to Florida, Prill was involved in an accident in 
Tennessee.72  Prill contacted the company president several times, and when 
the president requested that Prill tow the trailer back to Michigan, Prill 
(1962), and the second is the First Circuit case of NLRB v. Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 
1981).  These decisions deal primarily with employers’ authority to discipline employees when they 
engage in protected activities, as well as the nature of unfair labor practices in similar types of 
situations.  See Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 17–18; Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 908–09.  Although 
issues surrounding discipline and adverse employment actions generally arise when employees are 
punished for engaging in protected activities, those subjects exceed the scope of this Comment, 
which focuses on the modern limits of concerted activity in the Internet realm. 
 65.  See infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text. 
 66.  Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984). 
 67.  The procedural history of these four cases is as follows.  In Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 
(1984), the Board dismissed employee Prill’s complaint and held that Prill’s activities were not 
“concerted” under the NLRA.  In Prill v. NLRB (Prill I), 755 F.2d 941, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985), on 
Prill’s petition for review, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the Board 
for further consideration.  On remand, in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 
888–89 (1986), the Board reached the same conclusion as it did in Meyers I, but modified its 
reasoning based on the decision of the circuit court.  Finally, in Prill v. NLRB (Prill II), 835 F.2d 
1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Board’s ruling in Meyers II. 
 68.  See Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1484–85; Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 889; Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 
497, 499. 
 69.  Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. 
 70.  Id.  The “most significant problem” was that the brakes on his trailer failed to operate 
properly.  Id. at 504. 
 71.  Id. at 497. 
 72.  Id. at 497, 504.  The accident was not Prill’s fault, as the malfunctioning brakes caused the 
accident.  See id. at 497, 504.  Meyers Industries asserted that the crash was not a consideration in 
Prill’s later termination.  Id. at 504–05. 
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refused, citing safety concerns.73  Prill further arranged to have the local 
public service commission inspect his equipment following the accident, 
which resulted in a citation prohibiting the unsafe operation of a vehicle.74  
When Prill returned to work after the conclusion of his trip, Meyers 
Industries terminated Prill, stating, “[W]e can’t have you calling the cops 
like this all the time.”75 
The Board determined that Prill did not engage in concerted activity 
when he complained about the unsafe conditions of his equipment to both 
the company president and state authorities and when he refused to drive the 
truck and trailer for safety reasons following an accident.76  In so doing, the 
Board created a new definition for concerted activity, which remains in 
place today: an employee’s conduct does not qualify for protection under the 
Act unless it is “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and 
not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.”77  Because Prill was 
acting alone and “solely on his own behalf” when he made his complaints, 
his conduct did not fall within the protected category of concerted activity 
under the NLRA.78  The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals later 
 73.  Id. at 504–05. 
 74.  Id. at 497.  Following this citation, Meyers Industries determined that the trailer was not 
worth returning or even being repaired.  Id.  Rather, the company decided to leave the trailer and sell 
it for scrap.  Id.  Prill drove his truck back to Meyers Industries’ facility in Michigan without the 
trailer.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 498.  Prior to this incident, on another trip to Ohio, Prill had voluntarily stopped at an 
Ohio State roadside inspection station where officials cited the trailer for defects.  Id. at 497.  Prill 
provided the citation information to Meyers Industries at that time.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 498.  The Board emphasized the individualized nature of Prill’s activity and 
complaints: “Prill alone refused to drive the truck and trailer; he alone contacted the Tennessee 
Public Service Commission after the accident; and, prior to the accident, he alone contacted the Ohio 
authorities.  Prill acted solely on his own behalf.”  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 497 (emphasis added).  The Board honed in on the “united-action interpretation” of 
concerted activity when it stated that Section 7 “envisions ‘concerted’ action in terms of collective 
activity: the formation of or assistance to a group, or action as a representative on behalf of a group.”  
Id. at 493–94.  This type of group effort stands in stark contrast to Prill’s self-serving behavior, as 
characterized by the Board.  See supra note 76. 
 78.  Id. at 498.  Meyers I overruled the “per se standard of concerted activity” that prevailed at 
the time under Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).  Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 499.  
In Alleluia, an employee, Henley, repeatedly complained to his employer about safety concerns in 
the workplace.  Alleluia, 221 N.L.R.B. at 999.  Henley never enlisted the help of his fellow 
employees in voicing those complaints, and the administrative law judge who heard the case 
determined that “Henley was acting . . . purely on the basis of his individual concern with safety . . . .  
There is no evidence that Henley was acting in conjunction with any other employee in 
protesting . . . or that his activity had been an outgrowth or extension of discussions with other 
employees.”  Id. at 1004 (citations omitted).  Despite this finding, the Board ultimately ruled on 
appeal that Henley was engaged in concerted activity because he sought to compel compliance with 
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affirmed the Board’s conclusion in Meyers I and Meyers II, stating that 
protection under the Act extends when “individual employees seek to initiate 
or to induce or to prepare for group action,” as well as when “individual 
employees bring[] truly group complaints to the attention of management.”79  
Thus, had Prill merely contacted his coworkers to contest the violation of 
statutory safety provisions, he would have been protected under the Act.80  
The test for concerted activity elucidated in Meyers continues to be the 
principal guidepost for the NLRB today.81 
2.  Atlantic Steel Company: Setting Boundaries and Losing Protection 
Due to Opprobrious Conduct 
The 1979 case of Atlantic Steel Co.82 demonstrates the way in which 
employees engaged in protected concerted activities can, by the nature of 
their conduct, lose the protection afforded to them under the Act.83  Here, the 
employee Chastain approached his foreman during work hours and made an 
inquiry regarding the assignment of overtime by seniority, as he was 
concerned that an employee with probationary status had been assigned to 
work overtime.84  Upon hearing the foreman’s response that all of the crew 
was asked to take overtime, Chastain turned to a coworker as the foreman 
was walking away and either called the foreman a “lying son of a bitch” or 
said that the foreman told a “‘m—f—lie’ (or was a ‘m—f—liar’).”85  The 
foreman heard Chastain’s statement, and Chastain was suspended pending 
discharge and eventually terminated.86 
safety standards that “encompassed the well-being of his fellow employees.”  Id. at 1001. 
  Meyers I criticized Alleluia as “transform[ing] concerted activity into a mirror image of 
itself” whereby the Board could decide “what ought to be of group concern and then artificially 
presume[] that it is of group concern.”  Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 496.  In rejecting the Alleluia 
precedent, Meyers I held that “finding that a particular form of individual activity warrants group 
support is not a sufficient basis for labeling that activity ‘concerted’ within the meaning of Section 
7.”  Id. at 496.  In Prill II, then, the court highlighted that although Prill’s complaints about his truck 
and refusal to tow it may have benefited his fellow employees, “Prill acted alone” and was thus not 
engaged in concerted activity.  Prill II, 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 79.  Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1484.  The court noted that Congress intended Section 7 to equalize 
employees’ bargaining power by enabling employees to “band together in confronting an employer” 
regarding issues affecting the terms and conditions of their employment.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 80.  Id. at 1485.  The concept of reaching out to one’s fellow employees is especially relevant in 
analyzing current social media cases.  See infra notes 215–32 and accompanying text. 
 81.  See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 82.  245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979). 
 83.  Id. at 817. 
 84.  Id. at 814. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
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Chastain’s questions regarding overtime fell within the realm of 
protected concerted activity, as he was voicing a “legitimate concern” on 
behalf of his fellow employees regarding working conditions.87  However, 
the offensive and disparaging nature of Chastain’s conduct was such that the 
activity could no longer be shielded under the NLRA.88  The Board stated: 
“[E]ven an employee who is engaged in concerted protected activity can, by 
opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act.”89  A determination 
regarding whether an employee “has crossed that line” involves balancing 
the following four factors: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject 
matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the outburst; and (4) whether the 
outburst was provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice in any way.90  
 87.  Id. at 817.  “Chastain had properly questioned the foreman about overtime, and . . . the 
foreman had acted promptly to answer the question.”  Id. at 814. 
 88.  Id. at 816–17.  The fact that Chastain’s comments took place on the production floor made 
the case distinguishable from situations where employee statements occurred in “formal grievances 
or negotiating sessions which were conducted away from the production area.”  Id. at 816.  An 
employee may be permitted to utter obscenities or use strong language “in the heat of discussion” 
when it occurs as part of the grievance procedure.  Id. at 816; see NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 
351 F.2d 584, 586–87 (7th Cir. 1965) (stating that an employee’s use of an obscenity in 
superintendent’s office during a grievance meeting did not remove protection under the Act); see 
also NLRB v. Cement Transp., Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that an 
employee’s statement, referring to the company president as a “son-of-a-bitch,” was still protected 
when it took place during an organizational campaign). 
 89.  Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816 (emphasis added); see also Care Initiatives, Inc., 321 
N.L.R.B 144, 151 (1996) (“Among the specific types of conduct that could exceed the protection of 
the Act are vulgar, profane, and obscene language directed at a supervisor or employer . . . .”). 
 In Atlantic Steel, the Board upheld the arbitrator’s conclusion that Chastain’s use of insulting 
language “to other employees about their supervisor in the hearing of the supervisor cannot be 
regarded as ‘mere disrespect.’  On the contrary it shows a willful disregard for constituted industrial 
authority . . . .  Under any definition, this, in the setting it was found, constitutes insubordination.”  
245 N.L.R.B. at 815. 
 90.  Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816.  In applying these factors to the instant case, the 
arbitrator’s analysis took into account that the incident was on the production floor during work 
hours and not at a grievance meeting.  Id. at 816–17.  The arbitrator further noted that even though 
Chastain’s questions and the foreman’s response were both legitimate, Chastain’s reaction was so 
obscene—and without provocation—in a setting where such behavior was not normally permitted 
that Chastain’s conduct fell outside the protections of the Act.  Id. at 817. 
  On November 9, 2010, the NLRB posted this four-pronged test from Atlantic Steel on its 
Facebook page in the form of a wall post.  National Labor Relations Board’s Profile, FACEBOOK 
(Nov. 9, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://www.facebook.com/NLRBpage/posts/141052949280338.  The post 
read, “What’s the line?  When do Facebook comments lose protected concerted activity status under 
the National Labor Relations Act?  A four point test applies . . . .” and it went on to list the four 
factors.  Id. 
  The NLRB also added two comments under this same post.  Id.  The first comment dealt 
more broadly with the subject of protected concerted activity: “The NLRA protects employees’ 
rights to engage in protected concerted activities with or without a union.  Included is the right of 
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The Board affirmed the arbitrator’s decision and held that based on the 
above factors, Chastain’s statements were not protected, and his discharge 
was therefore warranted.91 
3.  Jefferson Standard: Relating to an Ongoing Labor Dispute; Must Not 
Be So Disloyal, Reckless, or Untrue as to Lose the Protections 
of the Act 
The 1953 United States Supreme Court case of NLRB v. Local Union 
No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard)92 is also important in determining when 
employees can lose the protection of the Act.  It involved technicians 
working for the radio station WBT, which was located in Charlotte, North 
Carolina and broadcasted both radio and television daily.93  The technicians 
were represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
and when their negotiations with the station reached an impasse over an 
arbitration provision, the union began conventional and peaceful picketing 
outside the station.94  Over a month after the picketing had begun, several 
technicians “launched a vitriolic attack on the quality of the company’s 
television broadcasts” by printing and distributing five thousand handbills 
which read: 
 IS CHARLOTTE A SECOND-CLASS CITY?   
 You might think so from the kind of Television programs being 
presented by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over WBTV.  
two or more employees to discuss terms and conditions of employment.”  Id.  It also provided a link 
to the NLRB website page explaining protected concerted activity.  Id. 
The second comment narrowed in on the specific issue of employees’ Facebook comments, in light 
of the November 2010 NLRB case in which social media speech was analyzed for the first time 
under the NLRA.  Id.  It noted that Lafe Solomon, the Board’s acting General Counsel, was quoted 
in the New York Times as saying: “This is a fairly straightforward case under the National Labor 
Relations Act—whether it takes place on Facebook or at the water cooler, it was employees talking 
jointly about working conditions, in this case about their supervisor, and they have a right to do 
that.”  Id.  The comment then posted a link to the New York Times news story.  See Steven 
Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing over Facebook Post, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09facebook.html. 
 91.  Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816–17.  The Board noted that a contrary result in this case 
“would mean that any employee’s offhand complaint would be protected activity which would 
shield any obscene insubordination short of physical violence.”  Id. at 817. 
 92.  NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953).  The case is 
known as “Jefferson Standard” after the name of the employer, Jefferson Standard Broadcasting 
Company. 
 93.  Id. at 466. 
 94.  Id. at 467.  The union also had placards and handbills on the picket line, which named the 
union as the representative of the technicians and accused the company of acting unfairly with 
respect to the arbitration provision at issue.  Id. 
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Have you seen one of their television programs lately?  Did you 
know that all the programs presented over WBTV are on film and 
may be from one day to five years old.  There are no local programs 
presented by WBTV.  You cannot receive the local baseball games, 
football games or other local events because WBTV does not have 
the proper equipment to make these pickups.  Cities like New York, 
Boston, Philadelphia, Washington receive such programs nightly.  
Why doesn’t the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company 
purchase the needed equipment to bring you the same type of 
programs enjoyed by other leading American cities?  Could it be 
that they consider Charlotte a second-class community and only 
entitled to the pictures now being presented to them?95 
These handbills did not reference the union, nor did they indicate that 
there was a pending labor controversy; they simply bore the “WBT 
Technicians” designation.96 
The Supreme Court upheld the company’s decision to terminate the 
technicians who disseminated the disparaging handbills.97  The Court 
reasoned that because the communication in the handbills was not identified 
as being related to an ongoing labor dispute—even though a labor dispute 
was in fact occurring at the time the handbills were disbursed—the activity 
was not protected under the NLRA, and the employer therefore had the right 
to terminate the employees for cause.98  The technicians in this case made a 
“concerted separable attack purporting to be . . . in the interest of the public 
rather than in that of the employees.”99  As such, because the attack was 
separated from the labor controversy, the company was permitted to 
 95.  Id. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The workers distributed the handbills on the 
picket line and in the public square several blocks away from where the company was located.  Id.  
They were also distributed in barbershops, restaurants, and buses, and some were mailed to local 
businesses.  Id.  The distribution continued for ten days.  Id. at 471. 
 96.  Id. at 468. 
 97.  Id. at 472. 
 98.  Id. at 476–77. 
 99.  Id. at 477.  The only connection the court could find between the handbill and the labor 
dispute was “an ultimate and undisclosed purpose or motive on the part of some of the sponsors that, 
by the hoped-for financial pressure, the attack might extract from the company some future 
concession.”  Id.  This requirement of explicitly tying the communication to a labor dispute has not 
changed in more recent Board analyses.  The Board reached the very same conclusion when 
analyzing similar facts in the 2000 case American Golf Corp., which held that an employee’s public 
distribution of a flyer that was damaging to his employer’s product and business policies was not 
protected activity, as the attack was made with the undisclosed purpose of influencing negotiations.  
Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1241–42 (2000). 
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discharge the technicians based on their conduct “as if the labor controversy 
had not been pending.”100  Finally, the Court held that even if the employees’ 
distribution of the handbills had constituted a concerted activity, they were 
still barred from receiving protected status because the nature of their 
conduct conflicted with the purpose of the NLRA.101 
4.  Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc.: Introducing Online 
Communication to the Canon of Protected Concerted Activity 
Cases, But Just Barely 
The 2007 case of Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc.102 is the most 
recent decision that the Board has relied on in analyzing current social media 
cases.103  Here, the Board determined that an employee’s statements on a 
website relating to the terms and conditions of her employment constituted a 
concerted activity, and as such, the employer’s decision to discipline her in 
response to those protected statements was unlawful.104  The employee, a 
nurse, wrote an article published on the union’s website in which she 
criticized the employer hospital’s policies and discussed staffing level 
problems that negatively impacted the nurses’ ability to perform their jobs 
(as well as compromised patients’ health).105  The hospital suspended the 
employee following publication of the online article.106  On review, the 
 100.  Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477. 
 101.  Id. at 477–78.  The Court cites to, among other decisions, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical 
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939) (“[T]he fundamental policy of the Act is to safeguard the rights of 
self-organization and collective bargaining, and thus by the promotion of industrial peace to remove 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce as defined in the Act.”).  Thus in Jefferson Standard, the 
technicians’ conduct was apparently held to be disloyal or reckless enough to go against the 
principles contained in the Act, therefore causing the employees to lose protection. 
 102.  351 N.L.R.B. 1250 (2007), enforced sub nom. Nev. Serv. Emps. Union, Local 1107 v. 
NLRB, 358 F. App’x 783 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 103.  See infra note 143. 
 104.  Valley Hosp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1252–54.  In its current analysis of social media cases, the 
Board asserts that Valley Hospital stands for the proposition that a finding of protected activity does 
not change if employee statements are communicated via the Internet.  NLRB, OFFICE OF THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL 
CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, 4 (Aug. 18, 2011), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 11-
74]. 
 105.  Valley Hosp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1252–54.  The employee made two other public statements 
against her employer, and the Board addressed them as well in its decision.  Id.  First, she made 
comments at a union press conference while the parties were involved in negotiations regarding 
staffing levels, and the comments were published in a newspaper article.  Id. at 1250.  Second, she 
distributed a flyer in which she was quoted as saying she was suspended for standing up with her 
coworkers against management.  Id. at 1251.  The Board determined that, in addition to her online 
article, these two statements were also protected concerted activities, and the hospital was therefore 
prohibited from engaging in an adverse employment action against her.  Id. at 1254. 
 106.  Id. at 1251. 
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Board held that her statements “clearly were related to the ongoing labor 
dispute over staffing” because they were made on the union’s website the 
day after a union rally took place that addressed staffing levels.107  There was 
no evidence that the online statements were disloyal or maliciously false, 
which would therefore forfeit protection under the NLRA.108  Thus, as long 
as protected concerted activity “is not unlawful, violent, in breach of 
contract, or disloyal,” employees who engage in such activity will not lose 
protection under the Act “simply because their activity contravenes an 
employer’s rule or policies.”109 
5.  Mushroom Transportation Company: Mere Griping Is Not Enough to 
Deserve Protection 
The case of Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB110 also provides a 
helpful illustration of the limits on protected speech under the Act.  In this 
case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that simply griping over 
employment conditions between two employees is not concerted activity.111  
The employee whose conduct was in question had a regular “habit” of 
talking to his coworkers and discussing their rights, and he was later 
terminated.112  The court held that just because the employee’s conversations 
related to the interests of other employees, this was not enough to grant the 
speech protection under the NLRA, as his conversations were not part of a 
broader attempt to take action alongside his coworkers.113  Rather, the court 
elucidated the proper test, stating, “Activity which consists of mere talk 
must, in order to be protected, be talk looking toward group action,” and if 
the conversation fails to meet this criterion, “it is more than likely to be mere 
‘griping.’”114 
 107.  Id. at 1253. 
 108.  Id. “[T]hese statements were intended not to disparage or harm [Valley Hospital] but to 
pressure [it] to increase staffing and thereby improve nurses’ working conditions.”  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 1254 (citing Commc’ns Workers of Am., Local 9509, 303 N.L.R.B. 264, 272 (1991)).  
Additionally, employers may not interfere with their employees’ right to engage in concerted 
activities by mandating some specific internal process for expressing work-related concerns.  Id. 
 110.  330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). 
 111.  Id. at 685. 
 112.  Id. at 684.  The employee’s conversations dealt primarily with holiday pay, vacations, and 
employer practices regarding work assignments.  Id.  The court looked “in vain” for evidence 
showing that the employee’s conversations related to “any effort[s] . . . to initiate or promote any 
concerted action to do anything[.]”  Id. at 684–85. 
 113.  Id. at 685. 
 114.  Id.  “[I]t must appear at the very least that [a conversation] was engaged in with the object of 
04 FERRALL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:24 PM 
 
1018 
B.  Standards for Employers’ Social Media Policies 
Today, forty percent of employers have a formal social media policy.115  
Employers may violate Section 8(a)(1)116 of the NLRA by simply 
maintaining improper work rules, even if they do not enforce them.117  It is 
important for employers to craft lawful and effective social media policies in 
order to avoid any potential liability before the NLRB.118  A two-step inquiry 
governs whether the maintenance of a rule violates the NLRA.119  First, if the 
rule explicitly restricts Section 7 protected activities, it is unlawful.120  
Second, if the rule does not explicitly restrict protected activities, then it will 
only violate Section 8(a)(1) if it is shown that: “(1) employees would 
reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule 
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been 
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”121 
The NLRB held that the above inquiry must begin with a reasonable 
reading of the rule in question, and it cautioned against “reading particular 
phrases in isolation.”122  The Board will not find a violation simply because a 
policy could possibly be understood to restrict protected activity.123  Rather, 
context is key—it provides the best indication as to the reasonableness of a 
particular construction.124  Take, for example, a rule proscribing “negative 
conversations” about managers, which was contained in a list of policies 
regarding working conditions and contained no further clarification or 
initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the 
interest of the employees.”  Id. 
 115.  SHRM Survey: More than Half of Employers Will Increase Social Media Outreach in 2012, 
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.shrm.org/about/pressroom/PressReleases/Pages/SHRMSurveyincreaseSocialMedia2012.
aspx. 
 116.  “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7] . . . .”  National Labor Relations Act 
§ 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006). 
 117.  Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998). 
 118.  See Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 7, 2012) (stating that 
the employer “violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a rule prohibiting employees from 
electronically posting statements that ‘damage the Company . . . or damage any person’s 
reputation.’”). 
 119.  See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004). 
 120.  Id. at 646. 
 121.  Id. at 647. 
 122.  Id. at 646. 
 123.  Id. at 647 (“[W]e will not conclude that a reasonable employee would read the rule to apply 
to such activity simply because the rule could be interpreted that way.”); see also Fiesta Hotel Corp., 
344 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1368 (2005) (“We are simply unwilling to engage in such speculation in order to 
condemn as unlawful a facially neutral workrule that is not aimed at Section 7 activity and was 
neither adopted in response to such activity nor enforced against it.”). 
 124.  See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, 343 N.L.R.B. at 647. 
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examples.125  This rule was determined to be unlawful because of its 
potential chilling effect on Section 7 protected activity; in the absence of 
further guidance from the employer, an employee could reasonably interpret 
the policy to limit his right to protected speech.126 
By contrast, the Board stated that a rule forbidding “statements which 
are slanderous or detrimental to the company,” which appeared on a list of 
other prohibited conduct such as “sexual or racial harassment” and 
“sabotage,” could not be reasonably understood to restrict protected 
activity.127  There, the Board determined that because the rule appeared 
alongside examples of harmful misconduct, “employees would not 
reasonably believe that the . . . rule applie[d] to statements protected by the 
Act.”128 
C.  Summary of Rules Regarding Concerted Activity 
Under Board precedent, therefore, concerted activity is a collective 
endeavor “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees” for the 
purpose of advancing group interests.129  Individualized efforts undertaken 
“solely by and on behalf of the employee himself” do not meet the threshold 
for concerted activity.130  A communication must also relate to an ongoing 
labor dispute in order to be concerted.131  Employees who engage in 
concerted activity may still lose the protections of the Act if their conduct is 
sufficiently opprobrious, reckless, disloyal, or maliciously false.132  Mere 
griping does not, on its own, amount to concerted activity.133 
As to employer policies, the NLRA prohibits employers from retaliating 
against employees who engage in protected concerted activity.134  Overbroad 
 125.  KSL Claremont Resort, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836 (2005). 
 126.  Id. at 832. 
 127.  Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002). 
 128.  Id.  On May 30, 2012, the NLRB Office of the General Counsel issued Memorandum OM 
12-59, which included a sample social media policy that the NRLB found did not violate the NLRA.  
NLRB, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (May 30, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 12-
59]. 
 129.  See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 130.  See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 131.  See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 132.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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social media policies that explicitly restrict protected activity—or that can be 
reasonably understood to do so—are unlawful.135 
III.  TRYING TO FIT A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: THE BOARD’S 
MISAPPLICATION OF DATED PRECEDENT TO CURRENT SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 
The Board’s Office of the General Counsel regularly issues “periodic 
reports of cases raising significant legal or policy issues.”136  On August 18, 
2011; January 24, 2012; and May 30, 2012; the Office issued memoranda on 
case developments involving social media.137  The reports, which describe 
recent decisions concerning social media, provide guidance as to the Board’s 
current position on what types of communications constitute protected 
concerted activities under the NLRA.138  The following provides descriptions 
of a few selected cases from the memoranda that were most helpful in 
clarifying the Board’s views on concerted speech. 
A.  Hispanics United139 
In this case, an employee posted on Facebook that one of her coworkers, 
Cruz-Moore, was criticizing the job performance of their fellow 
employees.140  The employee’s Facebook post also asked coworkers how 
they felt about the situation, and four employees subsequently responded to 
the post.141  The next day at work, the employer fired the employee who 
wrote the initial Facebook post as well as the four employees who 
responded.142 
The Board ultimately determined that the employees’ statements on 
Facebook constituted concerted activity under the Meyers standard, 
regardless of the fact that the activity took place on a social network 
 135.  See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 136.  MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 2. 
 137.  See id.; NLRB, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, REPORT OF 
THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (Jan. 24, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 12-
31]; MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, supra note 128. 
 138.  See generally Operations-Management Memos, NLRB, 
http://nlrb.gov/publications/operations-management-memos (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 139.  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012). 
 140.  Id. slip op. at 7. 
 141.  Id. slip op. at 7–8.  The Facebook post that started the conversation read, “Lydia Cruz, a 
coworker feels that we don’t help our clients enough at HUB I about had it!  My fellow coworkers 
how do [you] feel?”  Id. slip op. at 7.  Several employees posted responses, including the following: 
“What the f. . . .  Try doing my job I have [five] programs”; “What the Hell, we don’t have a life as 
is, What else can we do???”; “Tell her to come do [my f—-ing job and see] if I don’t do enough, this 
is just dum[b].”  Id. 
 142.  Id. slip op. at 8. 
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platform.143  The Board reasoned that the employee who made the first 
Facebook post was appealing to her coworkers for assistance, and that 
because their discussions related to job performance and staffing level issues 
in preparation for a meeting with the Executive Director, all of the five 
employees’ statements were protected under the Act.144  The Board stated 
that the employees were “taking a first step towards taking group action to 
defend themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe 
Cruz-Moore was going to make to management.”145  Further, the Board 
noted that protection under Section 7 “does not depend on whether 
organizing activity was ongoing,” nor on “whether the employees herein had 
brought their concerns to management before they were fired, or that there is 
no express evidence that they intended to take further action, or that they 
were not attempting to change any of their working conditions.”146  
Moreover, the employees’ postings were not “opprobrious” under the 
Atlantic Steel test so as to lose the Act’s protection.147 
 143.  Id. slip op. at 8–10.  In its memorandum describing Hispanics United, the NLRB Office of 
the General Counsel cited Valley Hospital for the proposition that a “finding of protected activity 
does not change if employee statements were communicated via the internet.”  MEMORANDUM OM 
11-74, supra note 104, at 4. 
 144.  Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 9–10.  The Board thus interpreted the 
instigating employee’s question (“My fellow coworkers, how do [you] feel?”) as a call for 
assistance, even though the employee failed to propose a course of action or remedy to the problem.  
See id. 
 145.  Id. slip op. at 9.  This argument seems attenuated at best.  The facts show minimal evidence 
of any intent to participate in group efforts to address working conditions.  If anything, this is a case 
of mere griping; under Mushroom, such behavior is not protected concerted activity under the 
NLRA.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 146.  Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 9 (emphasis added).  Here, the Board’s 
analysis seems to fly in the face of Meyers, which specifically required some sort of group action in 
order for activity to be protected under the Act.  See supra notes 66–81 and accompanying text. 
 147.  Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 9–10.  The case is especially disturbing 
because the Board appears to be protecting cyber-bullying in the employment context under the 
guise of upholding concerted activity.  Cyber-bullying is a growing concern in the workplace, and 
this aggressive behavior is damaging to both employees and to corporate culture.  See Anita 
Bruzzese, Workplace Becomes New Schoolyard for Bullies, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2011, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/jobcenter/workplace/bruzzese/story/2011/08/Workplace-becomes-
new-schoolyard-for-bullies/50081460/1.  When the employees in Hispanics United engaged in a 
targeted discussion on Facebook concerning Cruz-Moore, using both expletives and an arguably 
threatening tone, they essentially ganged up on her while on the job. 
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B.  Collections Agency148 
Here, the Board found that an employee at a collections agency was 
engaged in protected concerted activity when she posted a Facebook status 
update to her wall, including expletives, saying that her employer had 
“messed up” by transferring her to another department and “that she was 
done with being a good employee.”149  The employee was Facebook friends 
with several of her coworkers; one coworker responded and said she was 
“right behind” the employee.150  Another coworker put forth a similar 
affirmation, and a few former employees also chimed in about 
management.151  One former coworker suggested filing a class action 
lawsuit.152  The employer later discharged the employee for her Facebook 
comments.153 
The Board concluded that the employee’s Facebook statement, as well 
as the ensuing conversation it created, involved complaints about working 
conditions because the conversation related to a job transfer.154  Further, the 
Board determined that the activity encompassed employees’ initiation of 
group action; specifically, the Board interpreted the former coworker’s 
statement concerning a class action lawsuit to refer to participating in group 
activity.155  Based on these two considerations, the Board determined that the 
 148.  MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, supra note 137, at 3–6. 
 149.  Id. at 3. 
 150.  Id. at 4. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 3. 
 154.  Id. at 5. 
 155.  Id.  The Board applies its precedent too liberally here, as it appears the employee was simply 
complaining and not calling for group action.  Arguably, if the employee was the one who 
mentioned a class action lawsuit from the outset, that might constitute a collective solicitation to 
improve working conditions.  However, her initial post merely said that she was done with being a 
good employee, which seems individualized and self-serving and thus outside the scope of Meyers.  
See supra notes 66–81 and accompanying text. 
  In a complete departure from the type of analysis found in the Collections Agency case, 
however, the Board indicated earlier in its August 2011 Memorandum that very similar behavior by 
an employee at a retail store was not concerted activity.  See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 
104, at 17.  The employee posted a profane comment on Facebook complaining about the “tyranny” 
at the store and suggested that the employer would get a wakeup call.  Id.  Several coworkers 
responded to his comment and expressed support.  Id.  The employee wrote back that the Assistant 
Manager was being a “super mega puta” (“puta” is Spanish for prostitute).  Id.  When the employer 
fired the employee, the Board upheld the termination, saying that the employee’s postings were 
merely an expression of “individual gripe,” and that they contained “no language suggesting that the 
employee sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group action; rather they expressed 
only his frustration regarding his individual dispute with the Assistant Manager.”  Id.  This 
interpretation of the case seems entirely accurate.  However, it is unclear why the Board did not 
adopt the very same reasoning in the Collections Agency case. 
  Such inconsistency in the Board’s analysis from one social media case to the next may be 
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employee’s communications were protected concerted activity under the 
NLRA.156 
C.  Karl Knauz Motors157 
In this case, the Board ruled that where the employee Becker, a 
salesperson at a BMW dealership, posted photographs and commentary 
criticizing his employer’s sales event on his Facebook page, the posts were 
part of a protected activity.158  Specifically, Becker posted photographs of 
the food and beverages served at a major sales event, as well as images of 
his coworkers posing next to the food and a large banner advertising the new 
car model.159  Becker also posted the following remark: 
I was happy to see that Knauz went “All Out” for the most 
important launch of a new BMW in years . . . .  A car that will 
generate tens [of] millions of dollars in revenues for Knauz over the 
next few years.  The small 8 oz bags of chips, and the $2.00 cookie 
plate from Sam’s Club, and the semi fresh apples and oranges were 
such a nice touch . . . but to top it all off. . .the Hot Dog Cart.  
Where our clients could attain a[n] over[-]cooked wiener and a stale 
bun[].160 
partially due to the fact that the issue is young; however, the Board’s approach is no less confusing, 
and it should modify its analysis so that practitioners, employees, and employers alike can have a 
clear idea as to the Board’s position on concerted activity in the social media realm.  See infra notes 
176–253 and accompanying text. 
 156.  MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 5.  Another case in the August 2011 
Memorandum illustrates employee conduct that does not qualify as concerted under the NLRA.  Id. 
at 16–17.  Here, an employee at a nonprofit facility for the homeless was working the overnight shift 
when she had a conversation on her Facebook wall with two Facebook friends, neither of whom 
were her coworkers.  Id. at 16.  She posted that it was spooky being alone at night at a mental 
institution, that one client was cracking her up, and that she “did not know whether the client was 
laughing at her, with her, or at the client’s own voices.”  Id.  The employer discovered the 
employee’s posts and promptly terminated her.  Id.  The Board upheld the termination under Meyers 
because the employee’s conversation did not involve any of her coworkers, nor did she seek to 
induce or prepare for any group action.  Id. at 16–17.  Incidentally (though the Board did not address 
this possibility), even if the employee had engaged in the same online conversation with her 
coworkers, the fact that she was making fun of individuals suffering from mental illness would seem 
to render her conduct so opprobrious as to lose protection under the Act.  See supra notes 82–91 and 
accompanying text. 
 157.  Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
 158.  Id. slip op. at 6–7, 12. 
 159.  Id. slip op. at 7. 
 160.  Id. 
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The dealership fired the employee upon discovering the Facebook 
posts.161 
The Board concluded that, under Meyers, Becker engaged in concerted 
activity when he posted his comments and photographs regarding the sales 
event.162  The Board reasoned that Becker expressed the sentiment of the 
group by voicing the salespersons’ disappointment in the dealership (prior to 
the sales event, the employees informed management they were not happy 
with the choice of refreshments).163  Further, the Board ruled that the 
concerted activity was related to the employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment, as the salespersons were paid entirely on commission and were 
concerned about the impact the employer’s choice of refreshments would 
have on sales, and thus, their commissions.164  Finally, the Board found that 
the employee’s activity was not so opprobrious as to lose NLRA 
protection.165 
D.  Triple Play166 
Here, the employer, a sports bar and restaurant, fired two employees 
who took part in a Facebook conversation initiated by a former coworker 
about the employer’s tax-withholding policy.167  When several of the 
restaurant’s former and current employees discovered that they owed state 
income taxes related to their earnings at the restaurant, at least one employee 
raised the issue with the employer, and a staff meeting was arranged to 
address the issue.168  Thereafter, a former employee posted a statement and a 
shorthand expletive on her Facebook page expressing dissatisfaction at 
owing the taxes and stating that the employer’s owners could not even do 
paperwork correctly.169  Another employee “Liked” her post; in addition, 
three other employees commented, and one referred to mentioning to the 
 161.  Id. slip op. at 8.  The dealership also fired Becker for posting photos involving a car accident 
online; however, that involves a separate analysis from the issue here.  Id. slip op. at 9. 
 162.  Id. slip op. at 10. 
 163.  Id.  The Board noted that the employee told his coworkers he would put the photographs on 
Facebook, and it interpreted this to mean that the employee was speaking on all of their behalf.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Three D, L.L.C. (Triple Play), JD(NY)–01–12, Case No. 34-CA-12915 (NLRB Jan. 3, 
2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/34-CA-012915. 
 167.  Id. at 2–3.  From the outset, the fact that a former employee—and not a current employee—
initiated the conversation suggests that the purpose was to gripe, and not to improve terms of 
employment; a former employee no longer has an interest in improving working conditions at the 
company. 
 168.  Id. at 3, 8. 
 169.  Id. at 3. 
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employer that they would discuss the matter at the meeting.170  Several of the 
employer’s customers also joined in on the conversation.171 
The Board determined that the Facebook conversation related to 
employees’ mutual concerns about the employer’s administration of income 
tax withholdings, which is a term and condition of employment.172  
Additionally, the Board highlighted that the conversation “contemplated 
future group activity,” as one of the employees mentioned that she had 
requested the matter be discussed at an upcoming management meeting.173  
With respect to one employee’s use of the Facebook “Like” button, the 
Board stated that it “constituted participation in the discussion that was 
sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level of concerted activity.”174  Based 
on these considerations, the Board therefore deemed the activity both 
concerted and protected under the Meyers standard.175 
 170.  Id. at 3–4. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 8. 
 173.  See id.; MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 10. 
 174.  Triple Play, JD(NY)–01–12 at 8–9.  The Board went on to state that the employee’s 
selection of the “Like” option amounted to, “in the context of Facebook communications, an assent 
to the comments being made, and a meaningful contribution to the discussion.”  Id.  Here, the Board 
attributes much more weight to a simple click of a button than the action deserves.  Furthermore, the 
Board ignores how easy it is to “Like” a post on Facebook; the gesture has very little in common 
with actually banding together with a fellow employee at work and joining in his cause.  Moreover, 
it is difficult to deduce a person’s intent from a simple Facebook “Like,” let alone from his or her 
wall posts and status updates.  For the Board to elevate a “Like” to the level of “meaningful 
contribution to the discussion” seems forced and artificial within the context of concerted activity.  
See infra Part IV.B. 
  The Board’s position is especially interesting in light of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia’s recent decision in April 2012 that a Facebook “Like” is not 
constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment: 
Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient.  It is not the kind of substantive statement 
that has previously warranted constitutional protection.  The Court will not attempt to 
infer the actual content of [a plaintiff’s] posts from one click of a button on [a] Facebook 
page.  For the Court to assume that the Plaintiffs made some specific statement without 
evidence of such statements is improper.  Facebook posts can be considered matters of 
public concern; however, the Court does not believe Plaintiffs . . . have alleged sufficient 
speech to garner First Amendment protection. 
Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012).  It is surprising that a federal court 
would offer less protection—and under a broader standard—to Facebook “Likes” than the NLRB 
would under the narrower NLRA. 
 175.  Triple Play, JD(NY)–01–12 at 8–9. 
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IV.  SOCIAL MEDIA AS A CATEGORY ALL ITS OWN: THE INADEQUACY OF 
TRADITIONAL TESTS, AND WHAT MAKES SOCIAL MEDIA DIFFERENT FROM 
THE PROVERBIAL WATER COOLER 
The Board is misguided when it broadly asserts that communication 
over the Internet does nothing to alter a finding of protected activity.176  Not 
all Internet speech shares the same qualities.177  An email conversation 
between coworkers or an article appearing on a union website178 is markedly 
different from an employee’s rant about his boss on Facebook.179  The 
Board’s unwavering adherence to dated law and failure to recognize the 
uniqueness of social media communication not only hinders its interpretation 
of current cases, it also makes it more difficult to break away from 
backward-looking precedent in the future.180 
A.  The Public Factor: Acknowledging the Omnipresent Audience Built into 
Social Media Websites 
The principal aspect of social media communication that makes it 
different from traditional face-to-face interaction at the company water 
cooler181 is its public nature.182  Indeed, sites like Facebook and Twitter have 
paved the way in diminishing the modern concept of privacy, especially 
among younger generations who have grown up with the Internet.183  
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg claims that privacy is no longer a 
“social norm” and that people are now comfortable “not only sharing more 
information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people.”184  
 176.  See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 4. 
 177.  See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 178.  Arguably, these two examples could comport nicely with the Board’s view that Internet 
speech deserves the same analysis as anything else, because they do not contain the public element 
of social media websites.  See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 179.  See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 180.  See infra notes 233–53. 
 181.  See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
 182.  See Sprague, supra note 17, at 396–97. 
 183.  See id.; see generally Catharine P. Taylor, Facebook Oversharing Clogs the Feed, SOC. 
MEDIA INSIDER (Jan. 26, 2012, 1:22 PM), 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/166621/facebook-oversharing-clogs-the-feed.html. 
 184.  Emma Barnett, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg Says Privacy is No Longer a ‘Social Norm,’ 
THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/6966628/Face 
books-Mark-Zuckerberg-says-privacy-is-no-longer-a-social-norm.html. 
  At the same time, however, some level of privacy protection is critical to the success of 
social media giants, as indicated by Facebook’s February 2012 filing with the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission to sell its stock to the public.  Mark Milian, What scares 
Facebook: Privacy and Phones, CNN (Feb. 1, 2012, 5:36 AM), 
http://cnn.com/2012/02/01/tech/social-media/facebook-ipo-risks/index.html.  In its initial public 
offering registration, Facebook listed users’ concerns regarding privacy as a risk to business because 
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On Twitter, for example, a user’s “tweets” are visible either to everyone who 
visits the profile page (if the account is public) or to all of the user’s 
followers (if the account is protected).185  Likewise, when an individual 
creates a status update or wall post on Facebook, it is customary for all of 
her “friends”—whether they be close friends, acquaintances, distant 
classmates, or her mother and father—to have access to it.186  In November 
2011, the average Facebook user had 190 friends.187  With the single click of 
a button, then, social media users are able to broadcast statements, images, 
links, and videos to hundreds, if not thousands, of people instantaneously.188 
This omnipresent public audience is precisely what renders social media 
a category all of its own, separate from the traditional work environment 
addressed by the NLRA.189  Meyers—the leading test for the Board’s 
concerted activity analysis—focused on the importance of employees 
communicating directly with one another for an activity to be protected 
under the NLRA.190  But when it comes to employee communications via 
it could cause users to temper their use of the website.  Id.  Facebook cited the mishandling of user 
information as its primary concern (i.e., improper disclosure of personal data or hacker activity).  Id.  
Although information security breaches are a far cry from the subject of this article, the fact that 
Facebook identifies a direct relationship between its finances and users’ privacy concerns 
demonstrates that individuals across the globe do in fact have some basic expectation of privacy in 
the digital age.  Id.  This, in itself, is noteworthy: in November 2011, a district court decision held 
that Twitter users had no expectation of privacy in their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses as collected 
and stored by Twitter, and that even if they did, the users forfeited that expectation when they 
voluntarily disclosed the information to third parties in order to access Twitter.  In re Application of 
the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 131–33 (E.D. Va. 
2011); see generally Kevin Poulsen, Judge Rules Feds Can Have WikiLeaks Associates’ Twitter 
Data, WIRED.COM (Nov. 10, 2011, 2:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/wikileaks-
twitter-ruling/. 
 185.  About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/14016 (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2013).  The default account setting for Tweets is public.  Id. 
 186.  Facebook provides customizable privacy settings, whereby the user can choose to make all 
posts public—meaning they are visible even to non-Facebook users—or to restrict certain content so 
that only specified persons or groups can see it.  Data Use Policy—Sharing and Finding You on 
Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb (last visited Mar. 
24, 2013).  For purposes of this article, however, assume that the typical Facebook user allows all of 
his or her friends to see content posted on a wall or news feed. 
 187.  Lars Backstrom, Anatomy of Facebook, FACEBOOK (Nov. 21, 2011, 5:04 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150388519243859.  The median friend count was 
100.  Id.  Though Backstrom noted that the median figure “may seem surprisingly low” because “a 
quick survey of [his] own friends reveals that they almost all have more than 100” connections, this 
is the result of a “classic paradox regarding social networks” whereby “for most people, the median 
friend count of their friends is higher than their own friend count.”  Id. 
 188.  See supra text accompanying notes 186–87. 
 189.  See infra text accompanying notes 191–208. 
 190.  Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
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social media, third parties (i.e., non-employees) can become just as 
involved—if not more—in the conversation, and this has a significant 
impact on the employer–employee relationship.191 
Social media builds third parties into every communication by providing 
a constant group of listeners who can participate in the dialogue as they 
wish.192  This is significantly different from a standard workplace 
environment.193  When an employee posts a negative statement about his 
employer on a social media website, he reaches a far greater number of 
viewers than if he makes the same comment verbally at the office.194  He 
also reaches a more diverse group of people, many of whom are likely not 
his fellow coworkers.195  Customers, competitors, and members of the 
community alike may be able to see the employee’s statement.196  From an 
employer’s perspective, then, social media can injure the company’s 
interests more swiftly and severely than traditional forms of discourse 
because of the widespread nature of the communication.197 
 191.  See infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See Daniel Flamberg, The Psychology of Facebook, IMEDIA CONNECTION (Feb. 7, 2012, 
3:17 PM), http://blogs.imediaconnection.com/blog/2012/02/07/the-psychology-of-facebook/.  
Flamberg writes, “Facebook means you never have to be alone.  Facebook insures you always have 
someone to talk to and something to see and react to.”  Id. 
 193.  See infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See Sprague, supra note 17, at 417. 
 195.  See Adam D. I. Kramer, Connecting with. . . Sam Gosling: Facebook Psychologist, THE 
FACEBOOK BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010, 12:56 PM), 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=283497147130.  In this way, social media converges the 
workplace realm with that of home life and recreation.  Dr. Sam Gosling, a psychologist and 
professor who has researched social media expression, asserts that as new technologies emerge, 
individuals are bringing their distinct identities—i.e., the “home or family self, a friend self, a leisure 
self, a work self”—together via online social networking.  Id.  He states: 
On my Facebook profile, I have colleagues, I have family members, I have students, I 
have people who’ve read my book, I have all kinds of different people there and it’s 
much harder now to maintain that separation.  So I think one of the things we are being 
forced to do is accept the merging of identities that we may have tried to keep apart 
before. 
Id. 
 196.  See id. 
 197.  It could be argued that because standard print publication bears some similarity to social 
media websites in terms of scope of readership, social media does not deserve its own separate 
analysis.  See generally Adam Clark Estes, New York Times Print Circulation Rises, Sort of, THE 
ATLANTIC WIRE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/2011/11/new-york-times-
print-circulation-rises-sort-of/44392/ (stating that the circulation of the New York Times as of 
September 2011 hovered at 992,383).  It is certainly true that a print newspaper may have a greater 
number of readers than hypothetical employee John Smith’s Facebook wall.  However, the 
difference between the two media is the type of content generated by each one.  The newspaper has a 
process behind it that involves approval for publication, edits, review, etc., so that an employee rant 
would generally not take up the front-page headline.  John Smith, on the other hand, can get home 
after a day of work, log onto his Facebook account, and publicly accuse his boss of being a terrible 
manager or his company of being discriminatory.  His every post is essentially a leading headline.  
As long as another one of Smith’s coworkers chimes into the online conversation (which purportedly 
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One additional consequence of social media’s public nature is that any 
and all statements made online are permanent.198  Users’ profile pages on 
social media websites contain a record of everything the individual ever said 
or did on the site.199  Again, this can be more harmful for employers; an 
employee’s passing remark about his supervisor in the hallway may fade 
into the ether, but if he makes that same comment on the Internet, it is 
memorialized on-screen and forever searchable by individuals in his online 
social network.200  Although print publications such as magazines, 
pamphlets, and newspapers all share this quality, the difference is in the 
accessibility of the material.201  It is much easier to click through a person’s 
profile page to see what she said about her company back in August of 2006 
than it is to sift through stacks of archives in a library.202 
Even if employees’ rants about their employers on social media 
websites are determined to constitute concerted activity, the Board has 
misapplied its precedent, as both Atlantic Steel and Jefferson Standard 
suggest that such conduct is still unprotected.203  First, under the Atlantic 
Steel factors for determining whether an employee has forfeited protection 
under the NLRA, the first thing to consider is the place of the discussion.204  
The Board decided Atlantic Steel in 1979, long before the days of the 
Internet, when it could not have imagined the term “place” to mean an 
online social network.205  Regardless, the Board today insists that the 
character of an employee’s speech does not change whether it takes place in 
changes it from individual to group action), this activity counts as protected under current NLRB 
analysis. 
 198.  Sarah Worsham, Social Media is Your Permanent Record, SAZBEAN (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://sazbean.com/2010/09/22/social-media-is-your-permanent-record/. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  See id. 
 201.  See id. 
 202.  Although posts may decrease in popularity the longer they are online, making them arguably 
less injurious to an employer over time, the fact that individuals can still retrieve the information 
relatively easily is the distinguishing element.  See Pamela Vaughan, Shelf Life of Social Media 
Links Only 3 Hours, HUBSPOT BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/24507/Shelf-Life-of-Social-Media-Links-Only-3-
Hours-Data.aspx.  This is especially true with Facebook’s “Timeline,” which organizes users’ wall 
posts, photos, and other activity by date and makes old information even more readily accessible.  
See Introducing Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/467610326601639/ (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 203.  See supra notes 87–100 and accompanying text. 
 204.  Atl. Steel, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
 205.  Id. at 814. 
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the office or on Facebook.206  Based on the discussion above regarding the 
exceedingly public nature of social media websites, however, the place 
factor in the Atlantic Steel analysis takes on a more important meaning than 
the Board acknowledges.207  Thus, when a discussion occurs on a social 
media website where third-party viewers can see it, the place factor should 
always weigh heavily in favor of the employer.208 
Second, in Jefferson Standard, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
employee appeals to third parties will only remain protected if the 
communication relates to an ongoing labor dispute and is not so disloyal, 
reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protections.209  As applied 
to social media cases, this requires the employee to adequately identify that 
his comments are related to a pending labor dispute.210  Additionally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the employee’s statement must be in line with the 
purposes of the Act: to “promot[e] industrial peace and stability.”211  In 
Jefferson Standard, the Court deemed workers’ public distribution of 
handbills containing disparaging remarks against their employer disloyal 
enough to go against the purpose of the Act and to lose its protection.212  
Given the Court’s disfavor toward involving third parties in the 
conversation, employees who attack their employers on social media 
websites in full view of third-party readers should likewise forfeit protection 
under the NLRA.213  The NLRB has thus failed to appropriately apply both 
Atlantic Steel and Jefferson Standard to recent social media cases by 
maintaining protected status for online speech that is both public and 
widespread.214 
B.  The Intent Factor: Who Are You Talking to, and Why? 
Another important aspect of social media communication that makes it 
different from the company water cooler is the employee’s intent behind his 
statements.215  Meyers contemplated the need for an employee to involve his 
 206.  MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 4. 
 207.  See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 208.  See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 209.  Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 473–75 (1953). 
 210.  See id. at 474–75.  Thus, for a worker to come home at the end of the day and voice 
generalized complaints about his supervisor or company practices should not be protected.  See id.  
In Jefferson Standard, it was not enough that the timing of the disparaging handbills coincided with 
a labor dispute.  Id. at 476.  The employees needed to properly disclose both the context and reasons 
behind the handbill distribution.  Id. at 476–77. 
 211.  Id. at 476 
 212.  Id. at 472–75. 
 213.  See id. at 472–77. 
 214.  See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 215.  See supra note 184. 
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fellow employees in discussions about work in order for speech to be a 
protected concerted activity under the NLRA.216  Indeed, when employees 
gather together to discuss the workplace, we can infer that they intend to talk 
specifically with one another.217  However, with sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter, an employee need not intend to communicate with anyone in 
particular when he posts a rant on his status update about the workday; he 
speaks to no one and yet speaks to everyone.218  Statements on social media 
websites extend very broadly, and individuals can never be sure as to how 
many friends—if any—will comment on or respond to a particular post.  If a 
conversation ensues between coworkers, it may be merely incidental.219 
Surely, employees who publish negative statements about their 
employers online are intending to communicate with someone.220  But given 
the nature of social media websites, it is unlikely that employees’ primary 
intent when they post bad things about their company online is to band 
together with coworkers and discuss the terms of their employment.  This 
does not seem to be the type of situation that Meyers addressed.221  Meyers 
presented two possible categories for employee conduct: activity that is 
either “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees” or carried 
out “by and on behalf of the employee himself.”222  Using the facts from 
AMR as an example, where Souza called her boss a scumbag on Facebook,223 
such communication does not fit neatly within either of the Meyers 
classifications.  At first glance, Souza’s statement may seem like group 
activity, in that she conversed with her fellow employees about her boss 
after they responded to her post.224  But at the same time, Souza in no way 
directed her words toward her fellow coworkers; rather, she made a 
statement to all of her Facebook friends, which resembles individual activity 
 216.  Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
 217.  See id. 
 218.  See Flamberg, supra note 192. 
 219.  Under current Board analysis, though, when a coworker responds to an employee’s post 
about work, the conversation almost always automatically constitutes protected concerted activity.  
See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 220.  It is difficult to argue that by posting something in a public online forum, an individual 
intends not to communicate anything to anyone.  See Flamberg, supra note 192.  If a person really 
wishes to keep her thoughts to herself, she presumably does not choose to broadcast them over the 
Internet.  See id. 
 221.  See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 222.  Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. 
 223.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 224.  See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
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carried out on her own behalf.225  Thus, because Meyers does not address the 
distinct nature of employees’ social media communication, the Board should 
not rely on it in determining whether the activity is protected concerted 
activity under the NLRA.  Moreover, even if Meyers applies, employee 
complaints on social media websites are much more akin to activity focusing 
on individual rather than group interests, and as such, they are 
unprotected.226 
Finally, employees’ intent in posting rants on Facebook also goes to the 
griping rule laid down in Mushroom Transportation—namely, that mere 
griping is not protected under the NLRA.227  It appears that much of the 
negative communication posted to social media websites simply amounts to 
griping, and for the NLRB to elevate such talk to the level of protected 
discourse is inappropriate.  Take, for example, Hispanics United, where the 
employee posted on Facebook that one of her coworkers was criticizing her 
coworkers’ job performance.228  She seemed to intend to complain and vent 
to anyone who would listen rather than to initiate group action among her 
coworkers.229  Likewise, in Triple Play, where a former employee posted an 
expletive on Facebook stating that the employer’s owners could not do 
paperwork correctly, was she really seeking to address working conditions 
on behalf of her old coworkers?230  This is unlikely because her publication 
more closely resembles the comments made in Mushroom Transportation.231  
There, the court held that even though the employee’s statements related to 
shared concerns among his coworkers, he did not seek to initiate group 
action when he spoke and, therefore, engaged in mere griping.232  The Board 
has thus failed to heed its own rules by ignoring the standards set forth in 
Mushroom Transportation and by hastily concluding that the Act protects 
just about anything said between coworkers—even when what is said has no 
relationship to group activity. 
 225.  See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
 226.  See supra notes 66–81 and accompanying text. 
 227.  Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684 (3d Cir. 1964). 
 228.  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 7 (Dec. 14, 2012). 
 229.  See id.  Such behavior is also quite damaging to the individual’s fellow employees, i.e., the 
ones who are being griped about on Facebook.  See supra notes 139–45.  This further supports the 
argument that the activity should not rise to the level of protection offered under the NLRA. 
 230.  Triple Play, JD(NY)–01–12, Case No. 34-CA-12915, at 3 (NLRB Jan. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/34-CA-012915.  The fact that the individual was a former employee, and 
not a current employee, only strengthens the argument that she was merely complaining rather than 
trying to band together with people who were no longer her coworkers.  See supra notes 148–53. 
 231.  See Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 684. 
 232.  Id. at 685.  Here, an employee who repeatedly griped about employment conditions was not 
engaged in concerted activity.  Id.  In order to be protected, “[a]ctivity which consists of mere talk 
must . . . be . . . looking toward group action.”  Id. 
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V.  DEVELOPING A NEW FRAMEWORK: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE 
A.  Shifting the Focus in the Board’s Current Analysis of Online Social 
Media Communications 
Given the above considerations as to the uniqueness of social media,233 
the Board should modify its current analysis of protected concerted activity 
when employee speech takes place on social media websites.  First, with 
respect to the Meyers test, the Board should focus more closely on the 
employee’s intent when he posts an online statement.234  Although the 
identity of the speakers (i.e., coworkers or third parties) is a certainly an 
important consideration, the purpose of the communication is more 
indicative of whether the employee acts individually or for the group.235  In 
this way, activities will not automatically gain protected status simply 
because two or more employees exchange a handful of comments in 
response to a Facebook status update.236  If an employee intends to speak to 
the whole world, and a short discussion among coworkers ensues, this 
should not be considered protected; the employee has not demonstrated the 
requisite intent to initiate group action.237 
Additionally, the Board should modify its treatment of the first Atlantic 
Steel factor—the place of the activity.238  Currently, Board analysis fails to 
appropriately reflect the extremely public character of social media speech 
and its potential for harming employer interests.239  The place factor should 
automatically weigh in favor of the employer any time an employee makes a 
statement via social media websites.  In this way, the Atlantic Steel test will 
acknowledge the public quality of statements made on social networking 
sites.240 
B.  Employers’ Social Media Policies: An Opportunity for Employers to 
Create Their Own Social Networks 
Under the NLRA, employers can lawfully prohibit employees from 
 233.  See supra Part IV. 
 234.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 235.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 236.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 237.  See supra notes 219–32 and accompanying text. 
 238.  Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
 239.  See supra Part III. 
 240.  See supra Part IV. 
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making disparaging remarks about the company via social media, but with a 
hefty caveat: they may only do so with regard to unprotected speech.241  In 
essence, this means that if an employer can prohibit an employee from 
engaging in sexual harassment in the office, it can also prohibit the 
employee from making sexually harassing statements on Facebook.242  
Granted, this is beneficial in guarding against egregious conduct by 
employees.  However, it does nothing to help an employer that seeks to 
dissuade its employees from posting disparaging remarks about the company 
online.  The Board has demonstrated a strong commitment to declaring most 
social media communication protected, meaning employers cannot restrict 
such activity in their policies.243  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the 
Board will uphold any social media policies that bar employees from making 
negative statements online about management, company practices, or the 
employer in general.244 
If the Board refuses to permit curtailing employees’ speech on social 
media websites, one attractive option for employers is creating their own 
social networks for employees only.245  Dubbed “virtual water coolers,”246 
these platforms allow employees to create profiles, join groups, send 
messages, ask questions, and converse with one another without the 
information being exposed to the public.247 
These systems offer a solution to many of the issues raised in this 
Comment.248  First, they remove the problem of broadcasting employee 
speech across the Internet when it has the potential to damage an employer’s 
reputation.249  Without third-party viewers watching these conversations on 
corporate social networks, employers no longer have to worry about limiting 
employee speech to prevent harm to their company’s image.250  Second, 
these platforms resolve the problem of identifying individuals’ intent in 
 241.  See supra Part II.B. 
 242.  See supra Part II.B. 
 243.  See supra Part II.B. 
 244.  See supra Part II.B. 
 245.  See, e.g., Debra Donston-Miller, HCL’s Homegrown Social Network Connects 60,000 
Employees, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/thebrainyard/ 
news/social_networking_private_platforms/232500686; see also Features, CUBELESS, 
http://www.cubeless.com/?page_id=7 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 246.  Sarah Worsham, Cubeless—A Virtual Water Cooler, SAZBEAN (July 8, 2008), 
http://sazbean.com/2008/07/08/cubeless-a-virtual-water-cooler/. 
 247.  See id.  The term “virtual water cooler” is much more appropriate when applied to these 
types of websites because the forums are restricted to employees only and thus more closely 
resemble the traditional office environment. 
 248.  See supra notes 18–20, 176–232 and accompanying text. 
 249.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 250.  See Donston-Miller, supra note 245. 
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making statements online.251  Because only employees have access, workers’ 
participation on the network indicates that they intend to communicate with 
their coworkers rather than voice an opinion to the public.252  Finally, the 
employer can create rules prohibiting unprotected activities on these 
platforms in order to protect employee interests, and such rules will not 
violate Section 8(a)(1) under the Act.253 
VI.  IMPACT: BENEFITING THE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE ALIKE 
Narrowing the scope of what it means to engage in concerted activity on 
a social media website is critical for the benefit of workers and businesses 
throughout the United States.254  The Board’s trend of declaring that most 
employee speech on social media websites constitutes protected concerted 
activity is ultimately harmful to both employees and employers.255  On one 
hand, though current Board precedent may afford employees greater 
freedom on the Internet by allowing them to post freely in the public arena, 
such laxity makes employees much more vulnerable to online attacks and 
cyber-bullying by coworkers.256  Indeed, in the Hispanics United257 case, 
whereby five individuals participated in a Facebook conversation berating 
one of their fellow employees, the Board upheld their behavior as protected 
concerted activity, meaning the employer could not punish them for it.258  
Such a workplace environment is damaging to all parties involved.259  
Additionally, employers have strong interests in both maintaining control 
and uniformity throughout the workplace and maintaining a desirable online 
 251.  See supra notes 215–32 and accompanying text. 
 252.  See supra text accompanying note 218. 
 253.  See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.  It could be argued that this might have the 
countereffect of chilling employee speech; for example, if an employee knows that his employer 
owns the social network, this could deter him from posting his grievances online.  However, the 
employer-owned social network does nothing to deter other forms of communication between an 
employee and his coworkers outside the network.  The fact that an individual employee may choose 
to engage in the highest form of workplace protection by not participating in the network and 
refusing to voice any of his grievances in a public setting should not be used to suggest that 
employers’ provisions regarding social networks actually limit protected activity under the NLRA. 
 254.  See infra notes 255–66 and accompanying text. 
 255.  See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 256.  See supra note 147. 
 257.  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012). 
 258.  Id. slip op. at 7–9.  The conduct included using expletives and threatening remarks regarding 
their coworker.  Id. slip op. at 7–8. 
 259.  See id. slip op. at 7–9. 
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image.260  The Board’s current path lessens employers’ authority to manage 
their employees in a consistent fashion (as seen in Hispanics United) and 
compromises their ability to create and foster their own brands on social 
media websites.261 
The approach set forth in this Comment can temper these concerns by 
narrowing the scope of what constitutes concerted activity in the social 
media context.262  Removing that shield from employee conduct online will 
benefit employees and employers alike.263  First, employees will be protected 
from harmful statements or cyber-bullying from their coworkers.264  They 
can enjoy consistency in treatment, and no single employee or group of 
employees will be allowed to attack others without consequence.265  Second, 
employers can regain autonomy over their online presence and not have to 
worry about their employees making inappropriate statements that 
compromise the identity of the brand or management.266 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Social networks are a very recent phenomenon, and they continue to 
develop and evolve at a whirlwind pace.267  The Board has only just begun to 
address the many issues raised by this new mode of communication.268  Thus 
far, however, it has missed the mark.269  During the past several years, the 
Board consistently found that employees engaged in protected concerted 
activity when they posted negative statements about their employers on 
social media websites.270  In so doing, the Board failed to acknowledge or 
appreciate the important aspects of social media that make it wholly distinct 
from the traditional workplace environment.271 
The Board tries to force a square peg into a round hole when it insists on 
 260.  See supra notes 190–204. 
 261.  Stephanie Chen, Workplace Rants on Social Media are Headache for Companies, CNN 
(May 12, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/05/12/social.media.work.rants/ 
index.html. 
 262.  See supra Part IV. 
 263.  See supra notes 186–220. 
 264.  See supra note 147. 
 265.  See infra notes 267–68 and accompanying text. 
 266.  Philip Gordon, NLRB Report Challenges Validity of Many Commonly Used Social Media 
Policies, WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNS. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://privacyblog.littler.com/2012/01/ 
articles/labor-relations/nlrb-report-challenges-validity-of-many-commonly-used-social-media-
policies/. 
 267.  See supra notes 4–14 and accompanying text. 
 268.  See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 269.  See supra notes 176–232 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text. 
 271.  See supra notes 176–232 and accompanying text. 
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applying dated law to current social media cases.272  Rather than taking this 
opportunity to develop a new analytical framework and apply it to social 
media, the Board instead fell back on old precedent.273  Although the canon 
of protected activity cases (Meyers, Atlantic Steel, Jefferson Standard, 
Mushroom Transportation, etc.) is helpful to a certain degree in assessing 
employee communications via social media websites, these cases cannot 
adequately resolve all of the issues that spring forth from this novel 
territory.274 
The Board should consider both the public nature of social media as 
well as employees’ intent in broadcasting their thoughts online when 
determining whether an activity is concerted protected activity.275  These 
significant factors enable the Board to more accurately identify whether 
employees’ speech seeks to initiate group action or to further individual 
interests.276  Under the proposed analysis above, then, employees must lose 
the protection of the Act when they post negative statements about their 
employer on social media websites for three reasons.277  First, they lack the 
requisite intent to initiate group activity.278  Second, the public appeal to 
third parties renders the action so disloyal as to lose protection under the 
NLRA.279  Finally, when employees simply complain about the workplace 
instead of seeking to band together to address their working conditions, they 
engage in mere griping, which is always unprotected.280  For the foregoing 
reasons, the Board should alter its current analysis of social media cases and 
allow employers to prohibit employees from making disparaging remarks 
about their organizations on social network websites.281 
 
Natalie J. Ferrall* 
 272.  See supra notes 176–220 and accompanying text. 
 273.  See supra notes 184–208 and accompanying text. 
 274.  See supra notes 47–135 and accompanying text. 
 275.  See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text. 
 276.  See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text. 
 277.  See supra notes 215–32 and accompanying text. 
 278.  See supra notes 181–214 and accompanying text. 
 279.  See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text. 
 280.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 281.  See supra notes 204–35 and accompanying text. 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A. in English, University of 
California, Los Angeles, 2006.  Many thanks to the entire Pepperdine Law Review staff, and to 
Brittney Lane especially, for assistance in drafting and editing this Comment. 
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